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Abstract—Concolic execution is a powerful program analysis
technique for exploring execution paths in a systematic manner.
Compare to random-mutation-based fuzzing, concolic execution
is especially good at exploring paths that are guarded by complex
and tight branch predicates (e.g., (a*b) == 0xdeadbeef). The
drawback, however, is that concolic execution engines are much
slower than native execution. One major source of the slowness is
that concolic execution engines have to the interpret instructions
to maintain the symbolic expression of program variables. In this
work, we propose SYNFUZZ, a novel approach to perform scal-
able concolic execution. SYNFUZZ achieves this goal by replacing
interpretation with dynamic taint analysis and program synthesis.
In particular, to flip a conditional branch, SYNFUZZ first uses
operation-aware taint analysis to record a partial expression (i.e.,
a sketch) of its branch predicate. Then it uses oracle-guided
program synthesis to reconstruct the symbolic expression based
on input-output pairs. The last step is the same as traditional
concolic execution—SYNFUZZ consults a SMT solver to generate
an input that can flip the target branch. By doing so, SYNFUZZ
can achieve an execution speed that is close to fuzzing while
retain concolic execution’s capability of flipping complex branch
predicates. We have implemented a prototype of SYNFUZZ and
evaluated it with three sets of programs: real-world applications,
the LAVA-M benchmark, and the Google Fuzzer Test Suite (FTS).
The evaluation results showed that SYNFUZZ was much more
scalable than traditional concolic execution engines, was able to
find more bugs in LAVA-M than most state-of-the-art concolic
execution engine (QSYM), and achieved better code coverage on
real-world applications and FTS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Concolic execution is a very powerful program analysis
technique [6–10, 12, 20, 21, 49, 61]. When used in software
testing or bug finding, we mark untrusted inputs as symbolic
values and utilize the concolic execution engine to perform
path exploration. During the execution, the engine maintains (i)
symbolic values, which represents program variables (memory
and registers content) as symbolic expressions, and (ii) a set
of symbolic constraints over the symbolic values, which are
imposed by conditional branches that have been taken along
the execution path [9]. Whenever the engine encounters a new
conditional branch where the branch predicate is symbolic, it
constructs a boolean formula for each branch target condition
(i.e., predicate = true for the true branch and predicate =
false for the false branch). Then it consults a satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solver to check whether the branch
condition is satisfiable. If the branch condition is satisfiable,
the engine forks a new state (so as to explore both branches),
adds this new path constraint to the constraint set and continues
the path exploration as if the target branch has been taken. To
generate a concrete input that can follow the same path, the
engine can ask the SMT solver to provide a feasible assignment
to all the symbolic input bytes that satisfy the collected path
constraints. Thanks to the recent advances in SMT solvers,
compare to random mutation based fuzzing, concolic execution
is known to be much more efficient at exploring paths that
are guarded by complex and tight branch predicates (e.g.,
(a*b) == 0xdeadbeef).
However, a critical limitation of concolic execution is its
scalability [6, 9, 61]. More specifically, a concolic execution
engine usually takes a very long time to explore “deep”
execution paths. The slowness comes from two sources. The
first source is the SMT solver. The SMT problem is a
generalized version of the Boolean Satisfiability problem (SAT)
which is proven to be NP-complete. As the accumulated path
constraints grow, solving a new branch condition using the
SMT solver becomes slower [9, 37, 61]. The second source
of overhead is symbolic interpretation of instructions. In order
to maintain symbolic expressions, most concolic execution
engines interpret the target program instruction-by-instruction,
which is much slower than native execution. For example,
Yun et al. [61] reported that KLEE [7] is around 3,000 times
slower than native execution and angr [52] is more than
321,000 times slower. As a result, even with a targeted path
to explore [20, 38] (e.g., forcing the execution to follow a
given execution trace up to a certain point), it could still take
a concolic execution engine hours of time to finish interpreting
the execution trace. Due to the scalability issue stemming from
these two sources, concolic execution is not as effective as
greybox fuzzing in finding bugs in real-world programs. For
example, all DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge finalist teams
used both fuzzing and concolic execution to find bugs but most
bugs were found by fuzzers [54].
In this work, we aim to improve the scalability of concolic
execution by replacing symbolic interpretation with dynamic
taint analysis [41] and program synthesis [26]. More formally,
let T = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} be the branch trace of executing a
program P with a vector of bytes x as input. For each branch
bi that is directly controlled by input, we denote fi(xi) as its
predicate (i.e.fi is a boolean function evaluated to either true
or false, and xi are the relevant input bytes that directly
control the branch bi). By performing a byte-level dynamic
taint analysis, we can know both xi and the corresponding
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TABLE I: Bugs found on the LAVA-M data set by different testing techniques. SYNFUZZ outperforms most other techniques and found
many bugs that are not listed by LAVA authors. For other techniques, we used the number reported in the corresponding papers.
Program Listed bugs SYNFUZZ REDQUEEN NEUZZ Angora QSYM Eclipser ProFuzzer T-Fuzz Steelix VUzzer AFL Fuzzer SES
uniq 28 29 29 29 29 28 29 28 29 7 27 9 7 0
base64 44 48 48 48 48 44 46 24 47 43 17 0 7 9
md5sum 57 61 61 60 57 57 55 10 55 28 0 0 2 0
who 2136 2218 2462 1582 1541 1238 1135 41 70 194 50 1 0 18
evaluation result of fi(xi). However, to obtain a new input
xi
′ that can “flip” the branch bi (i.e., fi(xi′) ̸= fi(xi)) with a
SMT solver, we need to know the “body” of fi.
Traditional concolic execution engine solves this problem
through construction—by interpreting executed instructions
symbolicly, it keeps track of how fi is formulated. In this
work, we use program synthesis to derive the body of fi.
Specifically, given a black-box function fi, how to reconstruct
a function fsyni that generates the same output as fi when
provided the same input is a typical oracle-guided program
synthesis problem [28]. Therefore we (i) use dynamic taint
analysis to figure out relevant bytes (xi); (ii) mutate these bytes
to collect new input-output pairs; and (iii) leverage program
synthesis to derive fsyni . Once we synthesized a candidate
fsyni using existing input-output pairs, we can ask a SMT
solver to provide the corresponding xi′ that would allow us to
explore the other branch. Then we test this new input x′ with
the original program (i.e., the oracle): if the input indeed flips
the evaluation of bi, this means our synthesis result is correct;
otherwise we add this new input-output pair into the set and
continue searching for the correct fsyni . By doing so, we can
enjoy an execution speed that is close to fuzzing while retain
concolic execution’s capability of flipping complex branch
predicates. Note that similar to Angora [11], we only need
to perform the expensive dynamic taint once to capture xi,
generating additional input-output pairs. Then testing synthesis
results can be done without taint tracking.
The challenge of the aforementioned approach, however,
is that the search space for the synthesis grows factorially
over the size of fi. This means a naive, enumeration-based
synthesis algorithm (see §II for details) could become very slow
and overshadows the performance benefit of native execution.
To overcome this challenge, we drastically reduce the search
space by logging extra computational history of execution
(i.e., a sketch) during the dynamic taint analysis. Even though
we logged extra information, it is still scalable to perform
dynamic taint analysis for real-world applications. We observe
that, when synthesizing a new line of code, the synthesizer
needs to iterate through (i) possible operations and (ii) possible
operands, which could be the input bytes, concrete values, or
results of previous operations/lines. By limiting the possible
choices of operations and operands, we can make the search
much more efficient.
Based on this observation, SYNFUZZ extends taint labels to
include both operations and operands. In particular, each taint
table is a tuple (op, operand1, operand2, size), where op is
the operation that caused the two labels to merge, operand1
and operand2 are the corresponding labels that are merged,
and size is the size of the operands. An operand could be
the offset of input byte (leafs) or the index of another taint
table entry. This essentially allows us to maintain an AST-like
computation history of a taint label, yet with a major difference:
we do not record the value of any concrete (untainted) variable.
Instead, we use a simple placeholder (label 0) to indicate the
corresponding operand is concrete. We made this design choice
because (i) the potentially enormous number of unique concrete
values may quickly exhaust the taint labels; and (ii) in most
cases, actual values of these concrete variables can be easily
recovered during synthesis. In other words, we use dynamic
taint analysis to record as much information as possible and
rely on program synthesis to recover the lost information.
While we were implementing this idea, we also solved
additional challenges. The first challenge is how to identify bi
so we can record the corresponding input-output pairs. A simple
idea, as used by the AFL fuzzer [62], is to use the address of bi
as its ID. However, since the same branch instruction may be
executed multiple times under different context, the symbolic
expression of its predicate would also be different. As a result,
this method could prevent the synthesizer from constructing
the predicate because we are mixing input-output pairs for
different fi together (see §VII for more details). Ideally, we
should identify bi using its position in the execution trace T ;
but as the trace T could be very large, recording and parsing
the full execution trace could be very expensive. In our current
prototype, we used the call stack and the incoming branch to
represent the context as they provide a reasonable trade-off
between accuracy and scalability.
The second challenge is how to handle nested branches, i.e.,
when trying to flip a target branch bt, we want to preserve the
outcome of all precedent branches (bi, i ∈ [0, t)) so the trace
can still reach bt. Similar to traditional concolic execution [8,
20, 21], we solve this challenge by maintaining/remembering
the synthesized symbolic predicate fi for each bi and force them
to follow the same branch direction as in the trace. To achieve
this goal, we log tainted branch conditions in a chronological
order; then we process these branches in the same order. To
process a branch, we first check if the opposite branch is
satisfiable; if so, we create a new concrete input. Then we
add a constraint to the solver to force this branch to follow
the original direction. By doing so, when processing a target
branch bt, we also enforce all precedent branches affected by
the input bytes xt to follow the same paths.
Compared with taint-analysis-guided fuzzing, SYNFUZZ has
two main advantages. First, its ability to reconstruct complex
branch predicate allows it to handle more versatile predicates
other than magic number testing [35, 36, 45, 59, 60], simple
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transformations [2], and monotonic functions [11, 13, 50, 55].
Second, its ability to reconstruct and maintain symbolic
predicates allows it to consider multiple branches and avoid
accidentally flipping earlier branches in the trace.
We have implemented a hybrid fuzzing system with
SYNFUZZ and AFL. We evaluated SYNFUZZ with real-world
applications, the LAVA-M [15] benchmark, and the Google
Fuzz Test Suite (FTS) [25]. On real-world applications and
the FTS, we achieved better coverage than AFLFast [5] and
QSYM [61]. On LAVA-M data set (Table I), SYNFUZZ outper-
formed most other state-of-art fuzzers and symbolic/concolic
execution engines1. On FTS, we were able to find bugs faster
than AFLFast in most cases.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• New test generation technique. We proposed a novel
approach to perform formula-solving-based test genera-
tion by combining dynamic taint analysis and program
synthesis.
• Efficient fine-grained taint tracking. To achieve efficient
synthesis, we design and implement an efficient byte-
level dynamic taint tracking system to record detailed
information about how input bytes are affecting the branch
condition.
• Hybrid fuzzer. As a prototype, we implement a hybrid
fuzzing system SYNFUZZ and applied it to two fuzzing
benchmark suites with real-world applications. The eval-
uation results showed that SYNFUZZ outperformed all
other state-of-the-art testing techniques.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we provide a quick overview of fuzzing,
symbolic execution, and program synthesis. Then we highlight
the motivation for this work.
A. Background: Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a dynamic testing technique that tries to trigger
software bugs with randomly generated inputs. Based on
how the inputs are generated, fuzzers can be categorized
into generational fuzzers and mutational fuzzers. Generational
fuzzers can be grammar guided [1, 16, 19, 46] or learning
based [22, 44, 58]. Mutational fuzzers create new inputs
using random mutation and crossover [23, 40, 45, 59, 62].
Based on how much runtime information is gathered and
used, fuzzers can be categorized into blackbox, greybox, and
whitebox fuzzers. Blackbox fuzzers [1, 16, 40] do not consider
any runtime information to assist generating new inputs.
Whitebox fuzzers [8, 11, 20, 21, 45, 61] use heavyweight
program analysis techniques (e.g., dynamic taint analysis and
symbolic execution) to collect detailed information to assist
input generation. Greybox fuzzers [2, 13, 23, 34, 43, 60, 62]
use lightweight instrumentation to collect a small amount of
runtime information to guide input generation, such as coverage
information [23, 51, 62] and performance information [34, 43].
Since greybox and whitebox fuzzers have a feedback loop to
1Based on reported numbers
guide new inputs generation, they are also called evolutionary
fuzzers. Despite their simplicity, fuzzers are quite effective at
finding bugs [24].
B. Background: Dynamic Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution treat program inputs as symbolic values
instead of concrete values. Program variables (including
memory and register content) can then be represented as
symbolic expressions, i.e., functions of symbolic inputs. A
symbolic execution engine maintains (i) a symbolic state σ,
which maps program variables to their symbolic expressions,
and (ii) a set of path constraints PC, which is a quantifier-free
first-order formula over symbolic expressions [9]. To generate
a concrete input that would allow the program to follow the
same execution trace, the symbolic execution engine uses
PC to query an SMT solver for satisfiability and feasible
assignment to symbolic values (i.e., input). The advantage of
symbolic execution over random mutation/generation is the
ability to handle complex branch conditions more efficiently.
The drawback, however, is the lack of scalability. As mentioned
in the introduction, this is mainly caused by two reasons: solver
and symbolic interpretation [9, 61].
C. Background: Program Synthesis
Program Synthesis is the task of automatically finding
programs that satisfy user-specified constraints [26]. Program
synthesizers typically perform some form of search over the
space of programs to generate the program that satisfies the
constraints. The constraints can be expressed as input-output
examples, demonstrations, natural language, partial programs,
and mathematical logics. The search can be enumerative,
deductively guided, or constraint-guided. Since the search
space is extremely huge, many heuristics have been proposed
to prune the search space [57] or improve the likelihood of
finding the correct program [32, 47], including utilizing neural
network [3, 17, 33, 53].
In this work, we use oracle-guided, sketch-based, and
solver-assisted search for branch condition synthesis. In
particular, given (i) a vector of input bytes x, (ii) a set of
concrete variables C, and (iii) a set of possible operations O,
we enumerate functions f0, f1, . . . , fn as unique combinations
of them. Each function fi has l lines where each line lj has a
single operation oj ∈ O, a single output outj , and one or more
operands inj depending on the corresponding operation oj .
Operands can be input byte(s), concrete variable(s) c ∈ C, or
outputs from previous lines outk, k < j. Input bytes, concrete
variables, and outputs can be used in multiple lines. Once we
have constructed a function fi, we add observed input-output
pairs as constraints over fi:
assert(fi(x) = y), y ∈ {true, false}
and ask the solver to provide a feasible assignment of concrete
variables c ∈ C that would satisfy the constraints. Note that the
output has only one value because this work is only interested
in conditional branches that are always evaluated to true or
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false. If the solver is able to find an assignment, we have
a candidate function. We then ask the solver to provide a
feasible assignment of input bytes x′ that would yield the
opposite output (¬y). Finally, we verify the correctness of fi
by executing the original program P with the new input. If
the new input indeed flips the branch, we believe fi is the
correct function until a new counterexample is discovered;
otherwise we add the new input-output pair to the observed
set and continue the search.
D. Motivation
For coverage-driven testing techniques, the ultimate goal is
to visit both the true and false branches of every conditional
branch, i.e., 100% branch coverage. To achieve this goal, we
need the ability to flip conditional branches. For a conditional
branch bi that can be directly affected by inputs, this goal
can be achieved in two general ways. First, we can treat the
corresponding fi as a blackbox and try to flip its output
without understanding how fi maps inputs to the output.
Methods belong to this category include random guessing
(i.e., fuzzing) [23, 40, 62], simulated annealing [55], binary
search [13] gradient descent [11, 50], etc.
The second way is to “derive” fi (i.e., as a whitebox) and
then solve it mathematically. The most popular method in this
category is dynamic symbolic execution, where we derived fi
through symbolic interpretation and change its output using
an SMT solver. Another method researchers have tried is to
simulate fi using a deep neural network and flip the output
using gradient descent [51]. Whitebox approaches are more
powerful than blackbox approaches but the process to derive fi
could be very slow, making them less efficient than blackbox
approaches.
To speedup the deriving process, we make the following key
observations:
1) For most branches, fi is not complex in terms of (i) the
number of input bytes it depends on (i.e., the size of
the input xi) and (ii) the complexity of the computation
(i.e., the size of the body of fi). For example, during
our evaluation, we observed that 90% of the symbolic
predicates fi have less than 40 lines and less than 5
involved input bytes.
2) Dynamic taint analysis can be utilized to record more
information than input dependency, including involved
operations, or even the execute tree. Such information can
drastically reduce the search space for an oracle-guided
synthesizer.
Based on these observations, we believe program synthesis
could be a more efficient way to derive fi.
III. DESIGN
A. Overview
Similar to traditional concolic execution [20, 38], for each
branch that is directly affected by the input, SYNFUZZ aims
to generate a new input that flips the evaluation result of that
branch instruction (algorithm 1). More specifically, for target
program P which takes a vector of bytes x as input and yields
Algorithm 1: SYNFUZZ’s main loop.
Input : program: source code of the target program
Input : seeds: seed inputs
1 programnt ← compile program w/o taint tracking
2 programt ← compile program w/ taint tracking
3 foreach x ∈ seeds do
4 trace, labels← programt(x)
5 foreach b ∈ trace do
// extracts the partial AST of the branch
predicate fb from taint labels
6 sketch← PartialAST (labels, b)
// extracts the relevant input bytes
7 xb ← Args(sketch,x)
// extracted branch output from trace
8 fb(xb)← BranchOut(trace, b)
9 io← ∅ ; // initialize input-output pairs
// initialize new input and branch output to
generate
10 X′b ← xb fb(x′b)← fb(xb)
// repeat until the branch output is
changed/flipped
11 while fb(x′b) = fb(xb) do
12 io← io ∪ {(x′b, fb(x′b)}
// complete the sketch based on existing
input/output pairs
13 fsynb ← Synth(sketch, io)
// get a new assignment of relevant bytes
that may flip the branch
14 x′b ← Solve(fsynb (x′b) ̸= fb(xb))
// generate a new input by replacing old
relevant bytes with new ones
15 x′ ← Substitute(x,xb,x′b)
// test the new input
16 trace′ ← programnt(x′)
17 fb(x
′
b)← BranchOut(trace′, b)
// Success: x′b has new input flipping the target
branch
an execution trace T = b1, b2, . . . , bn, the primary goal of
SYNFUZZ is to construct a new input x′, which can change
the evaluation result of bi to the opposite (i.e., true→ false
or false→ true).
To achieve this goal, SYNFUZZ performs the following
analyses in order:
1) A branch-driven taint analyzer, which performs a light-
weight data-flow analysis particularly designed to extract
(i) which input bytes in x are used to evaluate the target
branch and (ii) roughly how these input bytes are used to
evaluate the target branch (i.e., a sketch).
2) A branch predicate synthesizer, which uses the taint anal-
ysis result and collected input-output pairs to synthesize
the symbolic branch predicate of the target branch;
3) A branch flipper, which uses the synthesis results (includ-
ing branch predicates prior to the target branch) to obtains
a new concrete input x′ that may flip the evaluation of
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the target branch.
B. Context-Sensitive Branch Tracking
As pointed out by Chen et al. [11], lacking context-sensitivity
could impact a fuzzer’s ability to discover interesting cases.
Lacking context sensitivity will cause additional problems
for SYNFUZZ. In particular, SYNFUZZ uses two binaries to
collect different information: one binary (programt) with taint
analyzer to collect the information on how input bytes would
affect each branch bi in an execution trace T ; and another
binary without taint analyzer (programnt) to collect input-
output pairs for the branch predicate of bi. We choose this two-
binary approach because even though dynamic taint analysis
is faster than traditional concolic execution, it is still very
expensive. Therefore, we would like to perform taint analysis
only when necessary. For the rest of the time, we would like to
use a binary without taint analysis so we can enjoy a throughput
similar to fuzzing. Moreover, this approach also allows us to
instrument programnt with other error detectors that may not
be compatible with the taint analyzer, such as address sanitizer
(ASAN).
The first challenge of this two binary design is how to
associate input-output pairs with bi. More specifically, the
same conditional branch statement bstatic can appear (be
executed) multiple times in the trace T ; and their symbolic
predicate could be different. Ideally, we should identify each
bi by its position in the execution trace T ; but as logging
and parsing execution trace are expensive, we opt for AFL’s
approach—naming each branch with a unique identifier. Then,
to distinguish different execution of the same branch statement,
SYNFUZZ associates each occurrence of bstatic with a context:
ID(bi) := context⊕ SID(bstatic)
In our current prototype, ⊕ is the xor operations and context
is defined as the calling context, which is a hash over the
current call stack:
context := SID(callsite1)⊕ · · · ⊕ SID(callsiten)
While there could be other definition of context that provides
less collision, we choose this approach for its simplicity and
the fact that computing xor with the same callsites would have
the same effect as “poping” the callee from call stack.
SID() is a function that maps an instruction to an unique
name. How to define SID() is the second challenge of the
two-binary approach. In AFL, instructions are identified by
its virtual address (i.e., SID(inst) := vaddr(inst)); however,
since SYNFUZZ uses two binaries, the same instruction
could have different addresses. An alternative approach,
as used in AFL’s llvm_mode, is to name each instruction
by its numeric order when iterating through instructions.
Unfortunately, two binaries of SYNFUZZ are built through
different instrumentation passes (e.g., DFSAN for programt
or ASAN for programnt) where each instrumentation pass
shows its own numeric ordering, this approach is not reliable
either. To solve this problem, we prefer to name an instruction
by its location inside the source code (i.e., filename, line
number, and column number):
SID(inst) := hash(module(inst)·line(inst)·column(inst)),
where module() returns the name of the source file that contain
inst, line() and colum() return the line number and column
number of the inst, and · is the string concatenation operation.
C. Branch-Driven Taint Analyzer
The goal of a branch-driven taint analyzer is to collect a
partial execution history, which provides guided information
(i.e., a sketch) for the branch predicate synthesizer to reconstruct
the symbolic constraints over bi.
An interesting aspect of our branch-driven taint analyzer
is that in order to scale to complex programs, SYNFUZZ
features a unique design positioning somewhere between
traditional dynamic taint analysis and a symbolic execution.
More specifically, traditional dynamic taint analysis aims to
answer data dependencies between sources (e.g., program
inputs) and sinks (e.g., branch predicates); but it cannot answer
how a dependency is formed. From this perspective, SYNFUZZ
is heavier than traditional dynamic taint analysis because
it collects much more information about the dependencies,
such as operations and common constants. On the other hand,
SYNFUZZ is much lighter than traditional symbolic execution
because it does not record the complete dependency information
(i.e., in the form the symbolic formula) as most concrete values
are not recorded. For this reason, SYNFUZZ does not perform
any interpretation—all instructions are executed on the real
hardware at native speed.
Another difference from traditional dynamic taint analysis
is that the sinks of our taint analyzer are conditional branches.
To be more specific, we are interested in the predicate that
controls a conditional branch. To capture the taint information
of a predicate, SYNFUZZ instruments comparison related
instructions which are usually ignored in traditional taint
analysis. Given a comparison instruction, SYNFUZZ checks if
any of the two operands is tainted; if so, it dumps the taint
information of both operands (concrete operand has a single
taint label untainted), as well as the relationship operation
(e.g., =,≤, >).
Byte-Level Taint Tracking. The foundation of SYNFUZZ’s
taint analyzer is a byte-level dynamic taint analysis from data-
flow sanitizer (DFSAN) [56]. Dynamic taint analysis extends
each memory byte and register with an additional tag to store
the taint label. A taint analyzer defines three policies [48]: (i)
how “taint” is introduced (a.k.a., sources), (ii) when labels
are checked (a.k.a., sinks), and (iii) most importantly, how
labels are propagated, especially how multiple labels should
be merged. When the label is binary (i.e., the label can only
be tainted or untainted), the propagation is relatively simple.
However, supporting byte-level taint tracking (i.e., each input
byte has a unique taint label) imposes additional challenges on
managing labels. First, a unique taint label is assigned to every
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input byte of x. The number of labels required grows as the
input size grows. Second and more importantly, the number of
possible combinations of the bytes grows in the order of the
factorial function. As a result, it is impossible to store all the
information into the taint label.
To solve this issue, data-flow sanitizer uses a data structure
called union table which is indexed by taint labels to store the
actual taint/dependency information. Labels inside the union
table are organized as a forest of binary trees: all initial input
labels are leaf nodes; and whenever two labels need to be
merged (e.g., involved in a binary operations like add), a new
label that points to the two labels as children nodes is created.
Operation-Aware Taint Analysis. To reduce the search space
of the synthesizer, the taint analyzer records more information
than data dependencies. This is done by extending the union
table. More specifically, as the union table from DFSAN is
already organized as binary trees where merging two labels
will result in a new table entry with the two input entries as the
child nodes, SYNFUZZ extends it to form an abstract syntax
tree (AST) like structure. In the extended union table, each
entry is a tuple (op, operand1, operand2, size), where op is
the operation that caused the two labels to merge, operand1
and operand2 are the corresponding labels that are merged,
and size is the size of the operands.
As a concrete example, let us consider an instruction c =
a + b. Because + operation is commutative, in traditional
dynamic taint analysis, there could be three cases: (i) if neither
a nor b is tainted, then c is also not tainted; (ii) if only one
operand is tainted, or they share the same label, then c would
inherit the same label as the tainted one; and (iii) if both a
and b are tainted and their labels are different, then the union
function U would create a new taint label lc := U(la, lb), where
la and lb are taint label for a and b, respectively. In SYNFUZZ,
we only have two corresponding propagation policies. The first
one is the same as traditional taint analysis: if neither a nor b
is tainted, then c is also not tainted. However, as soon as one
of the operand is tainted, SYNFUZZ’s union function USYNFUZZ
will create a new label lc := USYNFUZZ(+, la, lb, size).
Traditional concolic execution engines also maintain sym-
bolic formula of a variable as an AST, where the leaf node
is either a symbolic input or a concrete value. Unlike them,
SYNFUZZ’s union function does not record most concrete
values—they all share the same untainted label. The rationale
behind this design decision is two-fold: (i) the number of
unique concrete values can be very large which will quickly
exhaust the taint labels supported by a fixed size union table;
and (ii) most concrete values can be easily recovered by the
synthesizer.
Optimization: Common Constants. While the taint analyzer
does not record most concrete values, it does record a limited set
of common constant values to speed-up the synthesis process.
Specifically, non-linear operations like bit-wise shifting require
much more input-output pairs to recover the correct operands
than linear operations. At the same time, many of these non-
linear operations frequently use a small set of concrete operands,
e.g., shifting 8, 16, 32 bits. Based on these observations, besides
label 0, which represents untainted/concrete value, SYNFUZZ
also reserves the next n labels2 for frequently used constants.
Optimization: Load and Store. While our operation-aware
byte-level taint analysis already omits most concrete values
to limit the required taint labels, it could still introduce a
larger number of taint labels than traditional taint analysis.
This negatively impacts SYNFUZZ in two different aspects: (i)
memory space used by the union table becomes huge and is
exhausted more quickly; and (ii) it makes the symbolic formula
(i.e., fsyni ) large and in many cases, unnecessarily complex. To
address this issue, we designed several optimization techniques.
The first optimization is related to load and store operations.
In traditional concolic execution, both operations work at byte
granularity. As a result, loading data larger than one byte
will involve several “concatenation” operations; and storing
data larger than one byte will result in several “extraction”
operations. For example, considering a simple assignment
statement with two 32-bit integers: x = y, where x and y
are to-be-tainted and tainted integers, respectively. When the
load operation is recorded at the byte granularity, SYNFUZZ
needs to create three new labels:
lt1 := U(cat, lb1, lb0, 1)
lt2 := U(cat, lb2, lt1, 1)
ly := U(cat, lb3, lt2, 1)
where Lbi represents the taint label of each byte. To make the
matter worse, when storing Lx back to memory, SYNFUZZ
needs to create additional four labels:
l′b0 := U(extract, lx, 0, 1)
l′b1 := U(extract, lx, 8, 1)
l′b2 := U(extract, lx, 16, 1)
l′b3 := U(extract, lx, 24, 1)
In order to utilize label space more efficiently and makes
the symbolic formula to be synthesized simpler, SYNFUZZ
implements additional optimizations for load and store
operations. First, SYNFUZZ uses a special operation uload to
express loading a sequence of bytes:
label := USYNFUZZ(uload, lstart, size, size)
where Lstart represents the label of first byte and size indicates
how many bytes are loaded. When handling a load operation,
SYNFUZZ will first check if the uload operation is applicable
(i.e., the labels of the corresponding bytes are continuous)
before falling back to the old way. Second, when handling
store operations, if the label is a result of uload operation,
SYNFUZZ will directly extract labels of the corresponding bytes
from the uload operation; otherwise SYNFUZZ will assign the
same label to all the involved bytes without breaking them up.
The reason for doing this is because in most cases, integers
are stored and loaded as a whole; so only when the size of
load operation differs from the size of stored label, SYNFUZZ
will emit an extract operation (i.e., lazy-extract).
2 In our current prototype, n = 16, constants are 8× i, i ∈ [0, 15].
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Optimization: Concrete Folding. Similar to the constant
folding technique used by compilers, SYNFUZZ also folds
concrete values to avoid creating new labels. That is, when
handling binary operations, if one operand is concrete and the
other operand is a result of the same operation; then we will
check if the two concrete values can be combined, if so, we
will use the same label instead of creating a new one. For
example, for statement x = a + b + c, if both b and c are
concrete, we will fold them into a single concrete value.
Optimization: Avoiding Duplication. The last optimization
is to reuse existing labels so as to reduce the number of
created labels. This is done through a reverse lookup table.
In particular, the union table maps a label (i.e., index to the
table) to the corresponding taint information (op, l1, l2, size).
To avoid creating duplicated taint information, SYNFUZZ
uses a hash table to map taint information back to its label.
Whenever two labels need to be merged, SYNFUZZ first checks
whether (op, l1, l2, size) already exists. If so, it reuses the same
label; otherwise a new label is allocated to represent the taint
information. Note that in case l1 or l2 is concrete, this step
may introduce false “aliasing” as the actual concrete values
could be different. However, the variables that have same taint
labels can have different values, since concrete values can be
different. We mitigate this issue when synthesizing the branch
predicate.
D. Branch Predicate Synthesizer
After collecting taint information of branch predicates, the
next step is to reconstruct their symbolic formula. SYNFUZZ
uses oracle-guided program synthesis [28] to achieve this
goal. More specifically, for each branch predicate that can
be directly influenced by the input data, our taint analyzer
has already recorded its partial AST for both sides of the
comparison operation where the concrete operands are missing.
To figure out the correct value assignments to the missing
concrete operands, the synthesizer relies on an SMT solver.
Specifically, by symbolizing all the operands in the partial
AST, including the missing concrete values, the synthesizer
first constructs two symbolic functions (i.e., fb,l and fb,r,
representing symbolic functions for left-hand-side and right-
hand-side of the comparison, respectively) with the relevant
input bytes as arguments. The return value of these functions
are the values involved in the comparison operation. Then it
runs the target program (the version without dynamic taint
analysis) with those relevant inputs bytes mutated to collect
a set of input-output pairs. By binding the arguments to the
concrete input bytes and the return value to the observed
concrete operands of the comparison operation, the synthesizer
creates a set of constraints over the missing concrete operands.
Finally, it consults the SMT solver for a feasible assignment
of those concrete operands.
If the solver can find a feasible assignment—this is not
always possible, we will discuss later why this can happen—
we have a candidate predicate formula. The next step is to
consult the SMT solver again for a new input that can flip the
branch. This is done by removing the previous binding of the
1 int c = (utf[0] & 0x1f) << 6;
2 c |= utf[1] & 0x3f;
3 if (c == 254) { // target predicate
4 // target code to reach below
5 // ...
6 }
(a) Original code of target branch.
l81 := USYNFUZZ(or, l79, l80, 1)
l80 := USYNFUZZ(ZeroExt, l76, 4, 1)
l79 := USYNFUZZ(<<, l78, 0, 4)
l78 := USYNFUZZ(ZeroExt, l77, 4, 1)
l77 := USYNFUZZ(and, 0, l17, 1)
l76 := USYNFUZZ(and, 0, l18, 1)
(b) Logged taint labels relevant to the branch.
1 c0 = BitVec(’c0’, 8)
2 c1 = BitVec(’c1’, 8)
3 c2 = BitVec(’c2’, 8)
4 def temp_f_3_lhs(v17, v18):
5 v76 = c0 & v18
6 v77 = c1 & v17
7 v78 = ZeroExt(32 - v77.size(), v77)
8 v79 = v78 << c2
9 v80 = ZeroExt(32 - v76.size(), v76)
10 v81 = v79 | v80
11 return v81
(c) Synthesized function for the left-hand-side of the comparison.
1 s = z3.Solver()
2 s.add(temp_f_3_lhs(BitVecVal(0,8), BitVecVal(0,8))
3 == BitVecVal(0,32)) # utf[0] = 0, utf[1] = 0, c = 0
4 s.add(temp_f_3_lhs(BitVecVal(1,8), BitVecVal(1,8))
5 == BitVecVal(65,32)) # utf[0] = 1, utf[1] = 1, c = 65
6 s.add(temp_f_3_lhs(BitVecVal(2,8), BitVecVal(2,8))
7 == BitVecVal(130,32)) # utf[0] = 2, utf[1] = 2, c = 138
8 s.add(temp_f_3_lhs(BitVecVal(255,8), BitVecVal(255,8))
9 == BitVecVal(2047,32)) # utf[0] = 255, utf[1] = 255, c = 2047
10 # ...
11 if s.check() == sat:
12 # extract assignment from s.model()
(d) How input-output pairs are used to construct constraints and
get feasible assignments to the concrete operands.
Fig. 1: An example of reconstructing symbolic expressions
arguments and return values and bind the concrete values to the
feasible assignment. With fb,l and fb,r ready, the synthesizer
can then ask the SMT solver for a new set of relevant inputs
bytes such that the evaluation of the comparison operation
would be negated. However, because the synthesized functions
can be wrong, the new input may not always be able to flip
the branch. In this case, we have a counterexample. To fix the
incorrect functions, we add this new input-output pair to the set
to query for a new assignment. This is repeated until we found
the correct formula or the number of iterations have reached
a certain limit (e.g., 10 in our prototype). Next, we will use
illustrative example (Figure 1) to show how this process works.
Reconstructing Symbolic Predicate. When we execute the
code in Figure 1a, let us assume the taint analyzer logged a
branch predicate bp3 = (l81, 254, equal, 4), where bp3 means
a conditional branch at Line 3, l81 means the left-hand-side
of the comparison (i.e., variable c) is a tainted value stored
in the entry 81 of the taint label table, 254 means the right-
hand-side is a concrete value 254, equal means the relationship
operations is ==, and 4 means the operands size (l81 and 254)
are 4 bytes. The relevant taint labels (i.e., the partial AST for
c) are in Figure 1b.
SYNFUZZ synthesizes its symbolic formula as follows. First,
for each side of the comparison operation that is tainted the
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synthesizer creates a symbolic function: fi,l for left-hand-side
(if tainted) and fi,r for right-hand-side (if tainted). In the above
example, only the left-hand-side (i.e., variable c) is tainted, so
we only need to synthesize the formula for c. Next, to populate
the parameters and the body of fi,{l,r}, the synthesizer parses
the serialized partial AST from leaves to the root. Each leaf
node (i.e., label belongs to the raw input bytes) is added
as an argument to the function. For each non-leaf node, a
corresponding statement is added to the function’s body where
symbolic variables are created for both tainted and untainted
labels. Considering the example above whose partial AST is
shown in Figure 1b. The leave nodes are l17 (variable utf[0])
and l18 (variable utf[1]). For each non-leaf node (from l76 to
l81), a line is added, based on the involved operations and the
operands. If an operand has label l0 (i.e., a concrete value),
we create a new symbolic variable based on the operand size
(e.g., a bitvector variable c0 with 8 bits). Finally, the root
node of the partial AST will be used as the return value of
the function. Figure 1c 3 shows the constructed function for
the left-hand-side of the branch predicate in Figure 1a. Note
that since our prototype uses Z3-python binding, the types of
variables v76 to v81 are automatically inferred.
Collecting Input-Output Pairs. After reconstructing the
partial symbolic formula, the next step is to collect input-output
pairs for solving the concrete values inside the symbolic
formula. This is done by (i) mutating the argument bytes
of fi,{l,r} (e.g., in the above example, the 16th byte (v17)
and the 17th byte (v18)) (ii) execute the target program
with mutated inputs, and (iii) collect the operands of the
comparison operation (i.e., the output of fi,{l,r}). Note that
because the program we run in this step is without dynamic
taint analysis, it executes at the native fuzzing speed. The
output is logged to a file in the following format:
(ID(bi), oi,l, oi,r, oi)
where ID(bi) is the identifier of the target branch (as defined in
§III-B), oi,{l,r} are the concrete values of the operands in the
comparison operation, and oi is the result of the comparison
operation (i.e., the value of the branch predicate, either true
or false).
Solving Concrete Values. To find out the correct assignment
of the concrete values inside the symbolic formula, we use
the SMT solver. In particular, we first treat all concrete values
as symbolic and input-output values as concrete. And for each
input-output pair, we add a constraint:
assert(fi,{l,r}(xi,{l,r}) = oi,{l,r})
where xi,{l,r} is the input arguments to the corresponding
function we reconstructed in step one and oi,{l,r} is the output
we collected in step two. After adding such constraints for all
3BitVec(n, w) returns a w-bits bitvector, which can be referenced using a
name n. BitVecVal(v, w) returns a w-bits bitvector, which is initialized with
a concrete value v.
input-output pairs, the synthesizer then asks the SMT solver
to check the satisfiability. If the constraints are satisfiable, we
can get an assignment to all concrete values from the solver.
For example, to solve c0,c1,c2 in Figure 1c, we could add
the constraints in Figure 1d.
Optimistic Solving. Although we have added context sensi-
tivity in our branch tracking, it is still not as accurate as its
path-sensitive counterpart. Together with hash collision [18],
they introduced a problem for solving the concrete values.
Specifically, some of the input-output pairs we collected in step
two could be wrong. As a result, we could impose incorrect
constraints thus prevents the SMT solver from finding the
correct assignment. To mitigate the impact of this problem, we
perform optimistic solving. That is, instead of blindly adding
all input-output pairs as constraints, SYNFUZZ first checks if
the new constraint to be added is compatible with existing
model (i.e., adding it will not make the model unsatisfiable). If
so, the constraint will be added; otherwise it will be dropped.
E. Branch Flipper
After synthesizing both sides of the predicate for the target
branch, the next step is to construct a new input that could
flip the branch, i.e., forcing the execution to go through the
opposite path. This goal is to achieve similarity to traditional
concolic execution engines.
First, SYNFUZZ constructs the symbolic formula of the
branch predicate. After getting a feasible assignment of
concrete values for both operands of the comparison operation,
SYNFUZZ “concretize” them by replacing them with the
corresponding concrete values. For example, in Figure 1, we
re-assign c0,c1,c2 to the corresponding concrete values:
1 c0 = BitVecVal(0x3f,8)
2 c1 = BitVecVal(0x1f,8)
3 c2 = BitVecVal(6,32)
Now we have two completed symbolic functions fi,l(xi,l)
and fi,r(xi,r) and the predicate can be easily constructed as:
fi := fi,l(xi,l) : relop : fi,r(xi,r) (1)
where relop is the relationship operation (e.g., =,≤, >).
Next, SYNFUZZ parses the execution log to find out the value(s)
(oi) of the predicate. Then we consult the SMT solver for the
satisfiability of the following constraint:
assert(fi = ¬oi) (2)
If the constraint is satisfiable (i.e., the opposite branch is
feasible), SYNFUZZ then gets a feasible assignment to the input
bytes (xi,r and xi,l) and constructs a new input by replacing the
values of the those bytes with the assignments from the SMT
solver. However, compare to traditional concolic execution,
there are two additional challenges in SYNFUZZ.
Incorrect Synthesis Result. Unlike traditional concolic
execution, the symbolic expression generated by the synthesizer
may not be correct. This is because there could be multiple
feasible assignments to the concrete values that potentially
satisfy the constraints derived from the input-output pairs,
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especially when non-linear operations are involved. As a result,
the assignment we use in Equation 1 may not be the correct one.
To fix this problem, SYNFUZZ will execute the target program
with the new input generated by the branch flipper and watch
whether the target branch bi has been flipped (i.e., o′i ̸= oi).
If not, this input and the logged output (oi,l and oi,r) will be
added back to the input-output pair to get new assignment of
the concrete values and the branch flipper will try to generate a
new input based on the new assignment. This loop is repeated
until the branch is flipped (i.e., we have synthesized the correct
symbolic expression) or the number of iteration has reached a
threshold (e.g., 10 rounds), as we do not want to spend a lot
of time on a particular branch.
Nested Conditions. A limitation of previous taint-guided
fuzzers [11, 45] is that they only consider one branch at a
time. However, the input bytes that can affect the target branch
could also affect other branches, especially branches that are
executed before the target branch. As a result, the derived
input that aims to flip the target branch could accidentally
flip a preceding branch thus completely divert the execution.
The ability to recover the correct symbolic expression of a
branch predicate enables SYNFUZZ to overcome this limitation.
In particular, when capturing the taint information, the taint
analyzer logs branches in the chronological order they are
executed. During synthesis, the synthesizer also processes
branches in the same order, which means when trying to flip a
branch, we should already have the symbolic expressions of all
the branch predicates before this branch. To avoid accidental
flips of an earlier branch, the branch flipper maintains a global
context for each executed trace that is logged by the taint
analyzer where all the symbolic functions fi,{l,r} are visible and
all input bytes x are global. Then, after successfully generating
a new input that satisfies Equation 2, the branch flipper will
impose the following constraint to force the execution to follow
the same path:
assert(fi = oi) (3)
Since all input bytes (e.g., v17,v18) are global, when
checking the satisfiability of Equation 2, the SMT solver will
also consider all previous predicates where
(xj,l ∪ xj,r) ∩ (xi,l ∪ xi,r) ̸= ∅, 0 ≤ j < i
The drawback, however, is that this will make the solver take
longer time to check Equation 2. In §VI, we will compare
the performance of SYNFUZZ when enabling and disable this
ability, in terms of code coverage and speed.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present some implementation details of
our prototype.
A. Taint Analyzer
Our dynamic taint analyzer is implemented based on the
DataFlowSanitizer (DFSAN) [56], which is part of the LLVM
TABLE II: Memory layout of the program for taint analysis.
Start End Description
0x700000020000 0x800000000000 application memory
0x400010000000 0x700000020000 hash table
0x400000000000 0x400010000000 union table
0x000000020000 0x400000000000 shadow memory
0x000000000000 0x000000010000 reserved by kernel
compiler toolchain. It instruments the source code of the target
program with taint propagation logics.
Taint Storage. Since the instrumentation is actually performed
at the LLVM intermediate representation (IR) level, instead
of tagging registers, DFSAN inserts shadow variables to store
tags for all local variables, including arguments and return
values. Tags of heap variables are accessed via shadow memory.
Table II shows the memory layout of an instrumented program:
• shadow memory maps each byte of allocated heap memory
to its taint label (i.e., index to the union table);
• union table stores the actual taint information, each entry
stores the tuple (op, l1, l2, size) where l1 and l2 are also
taint labels.
• hash table maps a tuple (op, l1, l2, size) to its taint label,
as discussed in §III, this is a new data structure introduced
by SYNFUZZ to avoid duplicated labels.
• application memory is the memory used by the target
application.
To enforce this memory layout, a linker script is used to
restrict the application memory range to avoid colliding with
other designated regions. Then, once the program starts, the
runtime library of the taint analyzer reserves the designated
regions, so the OS kernel will not allocate virtual addresses
within these regions to the application.
Taint Sources. To assign labels to input bytes, SYNFUZZ
instruments file related functions. In our current prototype,
we only support tainting data from file and stdin; tainting
data from network is not supported yet but can be easily
extended. When the program opens a file which should be
tainted, SYNFUZZ calculates the size of the file and reserves
the input label entries. When the program reads from the file,
SYNFUZZ calculates the offset (within the file) and the size
of the bytes to be read, and assigns the corresponding labels
to the target buffer which receives the read bytes.
Occasionally, the target program may try to read data over the
end of the file, i.e., the bytes to be read is larger than available
data. In this case, SYNFUZZ tags the remaining buffer with
label -1 and “deceive” the program as if the data is available.
Later, if such data has actually been used, e.g., to calculate
the value of a branch predicate, this special label will logged
to indicate that the target program can handle larger input
data. Finally, when this special label is found in the taint log,
SYNFUZZ will increase the input data size and re-run the target
program.
Taint Propagation. Our taint propagation policies are almost
identical to DFSAN, the only difference is that when combining
two labels, we will also record the operation that causes the
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union, and the size of the operation. The following (bitvector)
operations are supported:
• Bit-wise operations: bvnot, bvand, bvor, bvxor, bvshl,
bvlshr, bvashr;
• Arithmetic operations: bvneg, bvadd, bvsub, bvmul,
bvudiv, bvsdiv, bvurem, bvsrem;
• Truncation and extension: bvtrunc, bvzext, bvsext;
• Special load (as defined in §III-C): bvload, bvextract.
In our current prototype, we do not propagate taint based on
control dependencies (a.k.a., indirect taint) and floating point
operations are also not supported yet.
Taint Sinks. In our current prototype, we consider icmp and
switch instructions as taint sinks (i.e., coverage-oriented). For
icmp instruction, SYNFUZZ checks whether any its operands
are tainted; if so, it serialize the taint information. First, it
dumps the predicate it self (llhs, lrhs, op, size). Then for llhs
and lrhs, SYNFUZZ recursively dumps the taint information
(i.e., the partial AST). For switch instruction, SYNFUZZ treats
each case as a comparison between the condition variable and
the case value; and dumps the taint information.
B. Branch Tracking
Branch tracking is implemented as a separate LLVM
pass which is based on the instrumentation pass of AFL’s
llvm_mode. Besides the tracking of control transfer between
basic blocks, the following logics are added. Firstly, SYNFUZZ
assigns an unique id for each icmp instruction and each case
of the switch instructions. As discussed in §III-B, the id
is calculated using the module name, the line number, and
the source code number of the corresponding instruction,
if available. A module level id list is maintained to detect
collisions. When a collision happens (e.g., for switch
instruction), we will append the concrete value involved in
the comparison to resolve the collision. For the hash function,
we used std::hash<std::string>(). SYNFUZZ also inserts
a call to a runtime function to dump the output of the
comparison (during synthesizing) in the format:
(ID(icmp), Vlhs, Vrhs, Vicmp)
Secondly, SYNFUZZ inserts a new global variable to store
the context information. To update the context, SYNFUZZ
first assigns each call instruction an unique id using the same
formula as described above. Then it inserts an xor operation
before the call instruction to updated the context variable
with ID(call). Finally, another xor operation with ID(call)
is inserted after the call instruction to “pop” the callee.
C. Synthesizer
The synthesizer is implemented using Python for its ability to
dynamically create functions through exec() and good support
from the Z3 [14].
V. HYBRID FUZZER
To evaluate SYNFUZZ, we also implemented a hybrid fuzzer
based on SYNFUZZ and AFLFast [5]. The hybrid fuzzer
takes two binaries, programnt for normal execution, including
fuzzing and input-output pairs collection; and programt for
taint analysis. Overall, our hybrid fuzzer follows the same
cross-seeding design as previous hybrid fuzzers [20, 38, 54, 61].
Specifically, whenever the fuzzer schedules a seed (i.e., input
that provides new coverage) for mutating, if the seed is not
skipped and has not been executed by the concolic execution
engine, it is fed to SYNFUZZ. Having received this new
input, SYNFUZZ first collects the branch trace T by executing
programt with the seed input. Next, for each branch in T ,
SYNFUZZ first mutates the relevant inputs bytes to prepare a
initial set of input-output pairs; then it invokes the synthesizer
to create a new input that may flip the target branch; if this
new input indeed flips the target branch, SYNFUZZ moves on
to the next branch; otherwise it adds the branch output to the
i/o pairs and asks the synthesizer to create a new input, until
a certain limit is reached. Because SYNFUZZ and the fuzzer
share the same method to execute programnt, if the input
generated by the synthesizer is able to trigger new coverage,
it will automatically be added to the seeds. Sharing the same
execution method also allows SYNFUZZ to utilize fork_server
and persistent_mode to speed up the execution.
Parallel Fuzzing. To effectively find target branch predicates
to be synthesized, we have implemented parallel fuzzing which
can synchronize from and to AFL fuzzers. Similar to AFL’s
parallel fuzzing, SYNFUZZ automatically fetches new inputs
added to AFL fuzzers, and tries to synthesize branches that
the new inputs generated. If SYNFUZZ is able to generate
the inputs that can flip branch predicates, SYNFUZZ checks
whether the inputs cover new paths by checking differences in
bitmaps of AFL fuzzer. If they cover new paths, they are added
to own queue of SYNFUZZ and automatically synchronized to
AFL’s queue by AFL fuzzers.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SYNFUZZ
with a set of real-world softwares and two standard benchmarks:
LAVA-M [15] and Google Fuzzer Test Suite (FTS) [25]. Note
that Google FTS also consists of real-world libraries from the
OSS-Fuzz project, such as freetype, openssl; and bugs are
not injected. Our evaluation focused on the following aspects:
• Scalability. The design goal of SYNFUZZ is to make
concolic execution scalable to real-world softwares; so
the first question we would like to answer is how effective
is the synthesis-based approach in term of code coverage
(§VI-A).
• Bug finding. For programs with known vulnerabilities,
we would like to know whether SYNFUZZ can improve
the number of found bugs and the speed of finding bugs
(§VI-B).
• Synthesis. The main feature of SYNFUZZ is to synthesize
branch conditions so that we would like to know how
many branch conditions can be correctly synthesized and
flipped (§VI-C).
• Multi-branch solving. One feature of SYNFUZZ is its
capability to flip a branch without affecting previous
branches; so we would like to know how important this
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Fig. 2: Code coverage comparison with different fuzzers. The x-axis
shows the fuzzed time in minutes and y-axis shows the average line
coverage. Shades around the lines are confidence intervals.
feature is for testing real-world applications and study the
cases (§VI-D).
Experimental Setup. All our evaluations were performed on
a server with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2683 v4 @ 2.10GHz
(40MB cache) and 512GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04
with Linux 4.4.0 64-bit.
A. Scalability
To evaluate whether SYNFUZZ can scale to real-world
applications and correctly synthesize symbolic formulas for
branch predicates, we used complex softwares which are tested
by fuzzers for a long time. We have picked some softwares
tested by AFL and OSS-Fuzz: libjpeg, libtiff, openjpeg,
tcpdump, file, and binutils and libraries in FTS. It is worth
to note that most concolic execution engines cannot run most
of the applications that SYNFUZZ was able to run [61].
In order to support these applications, we implemented
several features to SYNFUZZ. More specifically, because DF-
SAN performs source-code-based instrumentation, we cannot
perform a correct taint analysis for code inside an uninstru-
mented library. The default way is to write a customize/wrapper
function for the corresponding library function. However,
since FTS benchmarks depend on many libraries, this manual
approach does not scale very well. To solve this problem, we
compiled all the required libraries with DFSAN. For standard
C library, we used customized/wrapper functions to propagate
taint labels. For standard C++ library, we used instrumented
libc++.
We have measured code coverage of SYNFUZZ, and com-
pared it with recent works: AFLFast [5] (baseline), LAF [31],
and QSYM [61]. SYNFUZZ uses parallel fuzzing to sync new
inputs from AFL, and tries to mutate input bytes which affect
target branch conditions. With gathered inputs, condition values,
and a union table, SYNFUZZ generates inputs that may flip the
target branches, and test the inputs that actually flip the target
branches. If an input is able to flip the target branch, SYNFUZZ
checks whether the input covers new edges by comparing
AFL’s hitmap. If it explores a new edge, the input remains in
its own queue and will be synchronized to AFL fuzzers. This
parallel fuzzing is similar to that of QSYM, and we also use
three processes: two for AFL fuzzer and one for SYNFUZZ.
Since SYNFUZZ and QSYM use three processes while others
use one, we run SYNFUZZ and QSYM for 8 hours with 3
cores and others for 24 hours with 1 core. We ran 10 times
for each application. If the benchmark contains seed inputs,
we used the provided seeds; otherwise we used an empty
seed. For coverage improvement, we followed the suggestion
from [30], we performed Mann-Whitney U Test with standard
2-tailed hypothesis test. When the p-value is less than 0.05,
the improvement is significant.
Real-world applications. Table III shows the evaluation
results on real-world applications. Overall, SYNFUZZ is able
to improve the coverage on all applications over AFLFast,
LAF, and QSYM. Figure 2 shows the line coverage changes
during fuzzing. As shown, SYNFUZZ also achieved higher
code coverage faster.
FTS. Table IV shows the evaluation results. Overall, SYNFUZZ
is able to improve the coverage on 15 out of the 26
benchmarks when compared with AFLFast, including all
benchmarks marked as coverage testing: freetype2 (22.82%),
libjpeg-turbo (13.96%), libpng (10.36%), and wpantund
(3.93%, when multi-branch solving is disabled). Comparing
with QSYM, SYNFUZZ has better coverage on 11 benchmarks,
including all four benchmarks marked as coverage testing; and
has less coverage on 5 benchmarks.
For benchmark where we did not observe significant cover-
age improvement, we performed additional analysis. Some of
these cases are due to the fact that the target tests are relatively
simple (c-ares, json, llvm-libcxxabi, and re2) so the line
coverage is easily saturated.
B. Bug finding.
To evaluate whether SYNFUZZ effectively synthesizes branch
constraints and reduces time to find bugs, we used the LAVA-M
and FTS benchmarks.
LAVA-M. LAVA is a technique to inject a large number of
hard-to-find bugs into program source code [15]. The LAVA-M
corpus is created by injecting multiple bugs into four GNU
coreutils programs.Each injected bug has its own triggering
condition and a unique ID will be printed. Each benchmark
program is distributed with an initial seed and which command
line option should be used. In this evaluation, SYNFUZZ is
configured to use one process, fidgety mode, no dictionary, with
fork server, and with multi-branch solving. Each benchmark
was run for five hours, which is the test duration in the original
LAVA paper [15].
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TABLE III: Code coverage of real-world applications.
App Type AFLFast LAF QSYM SynFuzz
(C/C++) Avg Avg Avg Avg vs. AFLFast p-value vs. LAF p-value vs. QSYM p-value
binutils C 3082 3100 3118 3187 3.41% 1.80E-04 2.81% 1.81E-04 2.21% 1.80E-04
file C 3795 3801 4361 4406 16.10% 1.80E-04 15.92% 1.80E-04 1.03% 1.76E-04
libjpeg C 5121 5511 5493 5706 11.45% 1.77E-04 3.54% 1.81E-04 3.88% 1.81E-04
libpng C 7567 7577 7643 7767 2.63% 1.77E-04 2.50% 1.81E-04 1.62% 2.09E-04
libtiff C 9262 9771 11778 13581 46.62% 1.81E-04 38.99% 1.81E-04 15.31% 1.82E-04
tcpdump C 19334 20651 22085 22800 17.93% 1.82E-04 10.41% 1.82E-04 3.24% 1.81E-04
TABLE IV: Code coverage of Google FTS. Increases are all measured against AFLFast. Note that bold means the result is statistically
significant, it does not mean the result is best.
App Type(C/C++) Total
AFLFast QSYM SynFuzz w/o multi-branch SynFuzz
Avg Avg Inc(%) Avg Inc(%) p-value Avg Inc(%) p-value
boringssl-2016-02-12 C 47473 5099 5099 0.00 5099 0.00 2.00E+00 5099 0.00 2.00E+00
c-ares-CVE-2016-5180 C 179 115 115 0.00 115 0.00 2.00E+00 115 0.00 2.00E+00
freetype2-2017 C 74447 27852 31345 12.54 29906 7.37 8.83E-02 34209 22.82 1.36E-04
guetzli-2017-3-30 C++ 5155 3725 4178 12.15 4125 10.74 3.36E-01 4125 10.74 3.38E-01
harfbuzz-1.3.2 C++ 16279 9815 10144 3.35 9893 0.79 2.25E-01 10372 5.67 1.09E-04
json-2017-02-12 C++ 2569 2243 2243 0.00 2243 0.00 1.03E+00 2243 0.00 1.03E+00
lcms-2017-03-21 C 21466 4139 4902 18.42 4483 8.30 5.70E-01 5316 28.43 1.81E-04
libarchive-2017-01-04 C 36280 6733 6800 1.00 6810 1.15 6.73E-01 6790 0.85 2.37E-02
libjpeg-turbo-07-2017 C 21873 5279 5707 8.12 5595 5.99 4.50E-01 6016 13.96 8.37E-05
libpng-1.2.56 C 10848 3008 3163 5.14 3263 8.49 1.44E-04 3320 10.36 1.45E-04
libssh-2017-1272 C 23675 2085 2085 0.00 2085 0.00 2.00E+00 2085 0.00 2.00E+00
libxml2-v2.9.2 C 114842 10885 10763 -1.12 10824 -0.56 1.85E-01 10824 -0.56 6.36E-02
llvm-libcxxabi-2017-01-27 C++ 4075 3660 3660 0.00 3673 0.36 1.36E-02 3673 0.36 1.36E-02
openssl-1.0.1f C 102502 12863 13944 8.79 16306 26.77 2.41E-01 13694 6.46 5.71E-01
openssl-1.0.2d C 10801 3624 3722 2.71 3627 0.10 1.61E-03 3627 0.10 1.61E-03
openssl-1.1.0c-bignum C 89265 3416 3416 0.00 3416 0.00 2.00E+00 3522 3.10 1.82E-03
openssl-1.1.0c-x509 C 89212 13462 13462 0.00 13462 0.00 2.00E+00 13462 0.00 2.00E+00
openthread-2018-02-27-ip6 C++ 49640 4841 4901 1.24 5013 3.55 9.14E-05 5013 3.55 4.04E-05
openthread-2018-02-27-radio C++ 49507 10015 10368 3.52 10106 0.91 1.08E-02 10313 2.98 1.09E-04
pcre2-10.00 C 19852 13940 14242 2.17 14335 2.83 1.95E-02 14252 2.24 1.28E-04
proj4-2017-08-14 C 21004 4918 5418 10.16 5700 15.90 5.96E-01 5589 13.64 2.73E-01
re2-2014-12-09 C++ 8986 6007 5938 -1.14 6020 0.22 3.68E-01 6020 0.22 3.68E-01
sqlite-2016-11-14 C++ 70177 5143 5167 0.46 5408 5.15 3.38E-02 5017 -2.46 4.71E-01
vorbis-2017-12-11 C 11517 3658 3845 5.12 3810 4.17 4.13E-05 3810 4.17 4.13E-05
woff2-2016-05-06 C++ 12812 3038 3061 0.75 3122 2.76 5.08E-02 2985 -1.74 8.68E-05
wpantund-2018-02-27 C 19976 7345 7734 2.42 7634 3.93 1.40E-04 7261 -1.16 1.54E-02
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Fig. 3: Bug finding time of SYNFUZZ compared to QSYM for LAVA-M benchmarks.
Table I compares the bugs found by SYNFUZZ with data
reported by other fuzzers and concolic execution engine
[2, 11, 36, 42, 45, 50, 60, 61] and by the original LAVA
paper [15]. Overall, SYNFUZZ outperformed all state-of-art
systems except REDQUEEN [2]. For benchmarks with fewer
bugs (uniq, base64, md5sum), SYNFUZZ is on par with state-
of-the-art systems—they all found all the listed bugs as well as
some additional ones. The last benchmark who has many more
bugs than the other three programs and is the most challenging
one. On this benchmark, SYNFUZZ is second to REDQUEEN,
who was able to find all the bugs and 328 more. But SYNFUZZ
is able to solve more complex branch predicates. In 5 hours,
SYNFUZZ was able to find 1,958 (91.67%) listed bugs and
270 unlisted bugs. It worth noting that standard LAVA-M
benchmarks are compiled into 32-bit binaries; however, because
DFSAN does not support 32-bit mode, we have to compile them
into 64-bit modes. We have manually changed the build script
in LAVA, to be supported by SYNFUZZ. This may introduce
some discrepancies, as some bugs cannot even be validated
using the inputs provided as part of the benchmarks.
Figure 3 compares SYNFUZZ with QSYM on the number
of bugs found by fuzzing time. SYNFUZZ is very fast on the
simpler ones, it only takes less than 10 minutes to reach all
found bugs in uniq and base64, and less than 20 minutes for
md5sum. On who, QSYM finds significantly less bugs than the
reported number in [61], which is likely to be caused by 64-bit
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TABLE V: Reaching time of SYNFUZZ and AFLFast to known
bugs/code position.
App Location Reaching Time (hours)
AFLFast SynFuzz
boringssl-2016-02-12 asn1_lib.c:459 2.97 3.21
c-ares-CVE-2-16-5180 area_..._query.c:196 0.02 0.09
guetzli-2017-03-20 output_image.cc:398 2.29 1.27
json-2017-02-12 fuzzer-..._json.cpp:50 0.04 0.01
lcms-2017-03-21 cmsintrp.c:642 3.14 2.54
libarchive-2017-01-04 archive_..._warc.c:537 5.78 4.52
libpng-1.2.56 png.c:1035 6.15 5.97
pcre2-10.00 pcre2_math.c:5968 0.35 0.26
mode.
FTS. Table V shows the time SYNFUZZ and AFLFast took to
find bugs or reach a certain line of code in several benchmarks
in FTS. In this test, SYNFUZZ did not perform as well as
AFLFast in 2 of the 8 applications. For these applications, the
target bugs are behind a branch that can be easily solved through
mutation. Therefore, SYNFUZZ does not have an advantage
in these particular cases. However, in the applications where
the bugs are behind complex and/or tight branch conditions,
SYNFUZZ can finds target bugs faster than AFLFast.
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Fig. 4: Cumulative distribution of the number of lines and the number
of involved input bytes of the synthesized functions
C. Synthesis
To validate our synthesis-based approach is effective at
flipping symbolic predicates, we evaluated the complexity of
synthesized functions, which reflects the complexity of the
corresponding branch predicates. Since LAVA-M has tight but
not complex branch conditions, we used real-world applications
file and libtiff for this evaluation. Figure 4 shows the
cumulative distribution of the number of lines and involved
input bytes of synthesized functions (in black)4. On average,
synthesized functions have 10.19 lines of instructions, and 2.23
involved input bytes. We also measured the successful rate of
the synthesizer. A symbolic predicate is considered to be correct
if the generated input indeed flipped the corresponding branch.
In Figure 4, the red lines represent the number of correctly
synthesized functions. With optimistic solving, SYNFUZZ can
correctly synthesize 73% of total functions.
D. Multi-Branch Solving
Multi-branch solving was able to have benefit on flipping a
nested branch, which is especially beneficial for testing image
4 For display, we capped the maximum number of lines at 200.
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Fig. 5: Code coverage with and without multi-branch solving.
processing applications, since they have nested checks for
image headers. To see effectiveness of multi-branch solving, we
used libpng and libtiff without dictionary. Figure 5 shows
code coverage of SYNFUZZ with and without multi-branch
solving. Table IV also shows SYNFUZZ’s performance with
and without multi-branch solving. Overall, although disabling
multi-branch solving could make the concolic execution faster
and improve coverage on some applications, enabling it still
allows SYNFUZZ to explore more code on most applications.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Supported Operations. First, SYNFUZZ currently does not
support floating point operations, which could be added by
tracking taint information for floating point operations and
leveraging solver’s support for the floating point theory. Second,
SYNFUZZ currently only considers branch operations (icmp
and switch) as taint sinks/synthesis targets. For future work,
we plan to support synthesizing operands of other operations,
such as pointer arithmetic [29] and memory allocation [59].
More Accurate Branch Tracking. Although we added
context-sensitivity to branch tracking, we still observed in-
correct input-output pairs being collected due to collision of
branch id and context id and more importantly loops. For
example, consider a simple loop
while (i < 100) ++i;
In this case, the loop predicate can be expressed as i + c;
however, though c is concrete, it is not a constant—after each
iteration, c is increase by one. However, because context-
sensitive is not able to distinguish different iterations, the
synthesizer will not be able to generate the symbolic formula;
again, because c is not a constant. To solve this problem, we
plan to explore path-sensitive branch tracking.
Binary-only Taint Tracking. Our current taint analyzer is
based on DFSAN, which is included in the LLVM. While
this simplifies our implementation and is more efficient, it
also limits the capability of our prototype. In particular, we
cannot apply SYNFUZZ to binaries or software that is not
compatible with DFSAN, such as the OS kernel. To overcome
this limitation, we could utilize other taint analyzers, such as
PIN [61] and QEMU [27].
Faster Synthesis. Although we have already limited the search
scope of synthesis to concrete values, it still requires many
inputs to find the correct assignment when non-linear operations
are involved. One possible direction to further improve the
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speed of synthesis is to use machine learning technique to
learn from previous successful results [3, 33, 53].
VIII. RELATED WORK
Concolic Execution. Besides the performance issue, another
challenge for concolic execution is the path explosion problem.
To mitigate this problem, SAGE [21] proposed utilizing
generational search to increase the number of generated test
cases in one execution, which has been adopted by most
following up work. To compensate the scalability problem
of concolic execution engines, another popular approach is
to combine concolic executing with fuzzing [39, 54, 61, 63].
In these approaches, path exploration is mostly done by the
fuzzer, who is more effective at exploring easy-to-flip branches.
Whenever the fuzzer encounters a hard-to-flip branch, it asks
the concolic execution engine to solve it. The closest work to
SYNFUZZ is QSYM [61], which also focuses on improving
the scalability of concolic execution by minimizing the use of
symbolic interpretation. Compare to QSYM, our approach is
more “extreme:” we completely eliminated the use of symbolic
interpretation and resort to program synthesis to construct
the symbolic formula of branch predicates. Neuro-Symbolic
execution [51] explores another interesting direction—learning
a neuro-representation of branch predicate based on input-
output pairs and use optimization techniques to flip the branch.
Compare to SYNFUZZ, this method can solve constraints that
are not solvable by a SMT solver; however, it also requires
large amount of training data and is slower. So, we would
argue it is complementary to SYNFUZZ.
Taint-guided Fuzzing. Dynamic taint analysis (DTA) an-
other popular technique to improve the efficiency of fuzzing.
TaintScope [59] utilizes DTA to discover and bypass checksum
checks and target input bytes that can affects security system
library call. Vuzzer [45] uses DTA to locate magic number
checks then changes the corresponding input bytes to match
the magic number. Steelix [36] also uses DTA to bypass magic
number checks but has better heuristics. Redqueen [2] uses
the observation that input byte could indirectly end up in the
program state (memory), so by directly compare values used in
compare instructions, it is possible to infer such input-to-state
relationships without expensive taint tracking. Our evaluation
results re-validated this observation as we found many 1-line
symbolic predicates. However, for complex predicates, this
simple method will not work. Neuzz [50] approximates taint
analysis by learning the input-to-branch-coverage mapping
using neural network, which can then predict what inputs bytes
can lead to more coverage. However, it still uses mutation-
based solving so will have problems solving complex branch
predicates. Eclipser [13] exploits the observation that many
branch predicate are either linear or monotonic with regard to
input bytes and solves them using binary search. Angora [11]
is another close approach to SYNFUZZ. Its numeric gradient
descent based solving is more general than flipping simple
magic number check. Compare with Angora, SYNFUZZ have
two advantages: (i) SYNFUZZ considers nested branches when
flipping a branch and (ii) for simple predicate, synthesis requires
less input-output pairs.
Learning-based Fuzzing. In recent years, machine learning,
especially deep learning has also been widely adopted in
fuzzing. Learning-based fuzzing approaches learn from large
amount of valid inputs and use the learned model to guide
the mutation, so it is more likely to generate valid inputs.
This approach is much more efficient when the input has well
structured format and the target program employs rigorous
input checks. Skyfire [58] uses data-driven seed generation
technique to generate the well-structured seed inputs from huge
amount of previous samples. Learn&Fuzz [22] uses sample
inputs and neural-network-based statistical machine learning
techniques to generate of an input grammar. GLADE [4] uses
synthesized grammar learned from provided seeds to generates
inputs. Compare with learning-base approaches, we believe
SYNFUZZ is more transferable, i.e., it can be easily applied
to a new program without losing its efficiency.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new approach to perform
concolic execution. Our approach first uses dynamic taint
analysis to capture a partial AST of a branch predicate
then uses oracle-guided program synthesis to recover the
full symbolic formula. By doing so, we can eliminate the
symbolic interpretation of instructions thus greatly improved
the scalability of concolic testing. Our evaluation showed that
our prototype SYNFUZZ outperformed many state-of-the-art
testing techniques.
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